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RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING AND THE
TENSIONS OF A MOBILE SOCIETY

I ohn R. Schmidhauser*
"No man can boast of a higher privilege than the right granted to citizens
of our State and Nation of equal suffrage and thereby to equal representation in
the making of the laws of the land. Under our Constitution that right is absolute.
It is one of which he cannot be deprived, either deliberately or by inaction on
the part of a Legislature.•.•"t

spirit of contemporary appellate decision-making in the
field of voting rights is daring and realistic. This spirit is
perhaps best exemplified by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Baker v. Carr. 1 While deliberate deprivations of voting rights
assume a variety of forms, the most blatant have been grounded
upon racial discrimination. The 1961 report of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights indicates that in approximately 100
counties in eight Southern states most Negro citizens are prevented
from voting. 2 Economic considerations also have been recently invoked to provide a basis for disenfranchisement. In Virginia in
November 1962 approval was sought, albeit unsuccessfully, of a
state constitutional amendment rendering persons who were not
freeholders of land ineligible to vote on bond issue referenda for
new schools, streets, libraries and other local improvements. 3 Most
of the deliberate efforts at invidious restriction of suffrage have
received searching analysis by the United States Civil Rights Commission. But one of the most striking examples of denial of voting
rights because of legislative inaction, that arising from outmoded
state residency requirements for voting, was omitted from the long
list of "problems still unsolved" which was compiled by the Commission in 1961.4
It is the purpose of this article to determine the extent to
which persons othenvise qualified to vote are disenfranchised by
the complex of state residency requirements and to assess the practical and constitutional aspects of any statutory prospects for
change.
What are the dimensions of the problem of disenfranchisement

T
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• Professor of Political Science, State University of Iowa.-Ed.
Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 11, 161 A.2d 705, 710 (1960).
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 See 1961 U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. I, 5.
3 See Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1962, p. Bl, col. 6; id. Nov. 27, 1962, p. Al6, col. J.
4 1961 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., bk. 1, 5-6.
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through the operation of state residency requirements? Two salient factors are involved: the restrictions imposed by the particular state residency requirements and the mobility of the population of the United States. Certainly the restrictive nature of state
residency requirements for voting would not seriously affect voting
participation if Americans were not inveterate movers.
Geographic mobility has intensified at a comparatively steady
rate in every decade since 1900. Historical census data indicate
that the percentage of persons who do not live in the state of their
birth has in 1960 increased by 5.7 percent over the percentage of
such persons in 1900. The shift is much more striking among nonwhites than among whites. The percentage of non-whites who do
not live in the state of their birth has increased by 12.2 percent
(27.7 percent of the nation's population in 1960 as compared with
15.5 perc.ent in 1900). For whites the increase is modest-4.7 percent (26.l percent of the nation's population in 1960 as compared
with 21.4 percent in 1900). Demographically, the highest percentage of persons living in states in which they were not born is found
in urban settings (29.4 percent), the next highest in rural non-farm
areas (22.l percent), and the lowest in rural farm areas (12.1 percent). These and subsequent migration data were derived from
Census Bureau sources partially reproduced in the two charts and
the map. (See pages 825, 826 and 827.)
These three basic sources of demographic information underscore the following salient features concerning interstate mobility.
(a) Such mobility has increased steadily since 1900. (b) The rate
of increase has been more intense for non-whites than for whites.
(c) Geographically, interstate mobility is most characteristic of
urban dwellers, is next highest among rural non-farm dwellers,
and least significant among rural farm dwellers. With respect to
intrastate and interstate mobility, the census data indicate that
(a) nearly half of the urban and rural non-farm dwellers moved
to a different house in the five years prior to 1960, (b) over I 7
percent of such urban and rural non-farm dwellers moved to a
different county during the same time period, (c) rural farm dwellers experienced a markedly lower rate of movement, (d) nonwhites generally had a somewhat higher rate of movement than
whites, and (e) non-whites from rural farm areas experienced a
markedly higher rate of movement than whites. In short, the foregoing demographic information suggests that the persons most
likely to be adversely affected by rigid state residency requirements
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CHART I
State of Birth of the Native Population, by Color, for the United States, Urban and
Rural, 1960, and for Conterminous United States, 1900 to 1960•
Percent distribution
Born in the United States

Area, census year,
and color
UNITED

STATES,

Total
native
population

In
Total
State
native
of
population residence

In
different
state

State
of
birth
not
reported

Born in
U.S.
outlying
area, at
sea, etc.

1960

Total

169,587,528

100.0

70.3

26.4

Urban
Rural nonfarm
Rural farm

116,773,631
39,589,369
13,224,528

100.0
100.0
100.0

66.6
75.7
86.9

29.4
22.1
12.1

149,543,638

100.0

70.7

102,311,633
35,592,497
11,639,508

100.0
100.0
100.0

67.5
74.6
85.9

Nonwhite

20,043,890

100.0

68.0

Urban
Rural nonfarm
Rural farm

14,461,998
3,996,872
1,585,020

100.0
100.0
100.0

60.4
85.5
93.9

168,805,716
139,868,715
120,074,379
108,570,897
91,789,928
78,456,380
65,653,299

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

70.4
73.5
77.1
76.2
77.4
78.0
79.1

149,181,384
124,382,950
106,795,732
96,303,335
81,108,161
68,386,412
56,595,379

100.0
100.0
100.0

White
Urban
Rural nonfarm
Rural farm

2.7

0.6

3.2
1.8
0.9

0.8
0.3
0.1

26.2

2.4

0.7

28.8
23.2
13.l

2.8
1.8
0.9

0.9
0.3
0.1

27.2

4.5

0.3

33.7
12.3
5.2

5.5
2.1
0.9

0.4
0.2

26.3
25.2
22.4
23.4
22.1
21.6
20.6

2.7
1.0
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3

0.6
O.ll
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1

70.8
74.0
77.3

26.1
24.8
22.3

2.4
1.0
0.2

0.7
0.3 .
0.2

100.0
100.0
100.0

77.1
77.2
78.2

22.4
22.3
21.4

0.3
0.4
0.3

0.1
0.1
0.1

100.0
100.0
100.0

67.5
69.8
75.9

27.7
28.8
23.5

4.5
1.1
0.2

0.3
0.3
0.1

100.0
100.0
100.0

80.0
83.2
84.2

19.5
16.3
15.5

0.4
0.4
0.3

0.5

.

CONTERMINOUS
UNITED STATES
All Classes
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900
White
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900
Nonwhite
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900

19,624,332
15,485,765
13,278,647
12,267,562
10,681,767
10,069,968
9,057,920

• Adapted from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, GENERAL, SoCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, UNITED STATES SUMMARY, Final Report PC(l)-lC (1962) Table
68. Reproduced with the permission of the Bureau of the Census.
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CHART II
Residence Five \'ears Prior to Census Date, By Color, for the United States, Urban
and Rural, 1960, and for Conterminous United States, 1960 and 1940•
Percent distribution

Conterminous

United States, 1960
Residence 5 years prior to
census date and color

United States

Total

Total

Urban

Rural
nonfarm

159,003,807

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

79,331,022
75,185,793
47,461,137
27,724,656
18,588,173
14,141,483
2,002,822
2;184,170

49.9
47.3
29.8
17.4
8.5

·17.9
48.9
31.8
17.6
8.1

9.4

1.3
1.6

1.5
1.7

71.4
28.0
19.2
8,8
5.9
2.8
0.2
0.4

49.9
47,2
29.9
17.4
8.6
8.8
1.2
1.6

(1)
(1)
(1)
13.0
7.6

8.9

48.7
49.0
29.0
20.0
10.7
9.3
1.0
1.4

141,472,113

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

70,912,796
66,704,903
40,863,788
25,841,115
12,762,949
13,078,166
1,834,946
2,019,468

50.1
47.2
28.9
18.3
9.0
9.2

48.1
49.6
28.8
20.9
11.1
9.7
1.0
1.3

72.9

50.2
47.1
28.9
18.2
9.0
9.2

1.4

48.3
48.6
30.2
18.4
8,7
9.8
1.5
1.G

1.8
1.4

(1)
(1)
(1)
13.4
7.9
5.5
0.3
0.9

17,531,694

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

8,418.226
8,480,890
6,597,349
1,883.541
820.224
1,063,317
167,876
464,702

48.0
48.·I
37.6
'10.7
4.7
6.1
1.0

45.0
no.8
39.9
10.9
4.1
6.9
I.I

54.5

59.5

(1)

42.6
31.1

2.7

3.1

40.0
33.0
7.0
5.3
1.7
0.1
0.4

4'1.9
48.5
37.7
10.8
4.7
6.1
0.9
2.7

Rural
farm

1960

1940

TOTAL

Population 5 years ol<l and 01·er
Same house
Diflerent house in the U.S.
Same county
Different county
Same State
Different State
Abroad
Place of prior residence not reported2

5.4
0.3,
0.9

WHITE

Population 5 years old and over
Same house
Diflerent house in the U.S.
Same county
Diflerent county
Same State
Different State
Abroa,1
Place of prior residence not reported2

1.3

26.5
17.5
'9,0
6.0
3.0
0.2
0.4

Same house
Different house in the U.S.
Same county
Different county
Same State
Different State
Abroad
Place of prior residence not reported:?

z

~

~
~
;::l
t,:j

NONWHITE

l'opulation 5 years old and over

....C')~
....::i::
~

11.5
6.7
4.9
0.9
2.0

~

(I)
(1)
9.4
5.6
3.9

0.1
1.2

• .\daptcd from U.S. BVREAV OF TIIF. CU.SLS, U.S. CtNSVS OF PoPVUTtos: 1960, GENFML, SOCIAL MID ECONOMIC CIIAR\CTDUSTICS, UNITED STATES
~"""·'"'• t'inJI Report l'C(l)•IC (1962) Table 71. Reproduced with th~ permission of the Bureau of the Census.
1 l'crsons lhlng In the same house in 19,5 and persons living in a different house in the same county or quasl•county (cities of 100,000 or
more and the balance of their counties) in 1935 not tabulated separate!)',
~ In 1960, comprises persons who mo,ed but for whom place of residence In 195:i was not reported. In 1940, comprises persons for whom
migration stalus was not rtportc<l.

~
!-'
O'l
1-1

MAP I
Movers, 1955 to 1960, as percent of population 5 years old and over, by states: 1960•
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O'l
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• U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, GENERAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS,
UNITED STATES SUMMARY, Final Report PC(l)-lC (1962) Figure 4. Reproduced with the permission of the Bureau of the
Census.
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for voting are those caught up in the two major historic streams of
domestic migration-from farm and small town to city, and from
the South to other regions of the United States.
Given an intensive rate of geographic mobility in the 1960's,
what is the precise nature of state residency laws affecting voting?
Modern laws of this genre are surprisingly uniform in regard to
their theoretical bases despite considerable diversity in the details
of such legislation. In general, state residency requirement laws
concerning voting have reflected two fundamental assumptions
which were especially important in nineteenth century America.
First, liberal democracy, while presupposing the accessibility of
voting facilities, requires that adequate safeguards be devised to
inhibit corruption of elections. Harsh nineteenth century experience with "floaters" and the organized voting of transients 5 continues to influence strongly the development of residency provisions relating to the exercise of suffrage. For example, the major
concern underlying the voting registration recommendations of
the National Municipal League is the desire to thwart voting
fraud. 6 Secondly, state residency requirements for voting reflect
nineteenth century conceptions of federalism which, in practical
effect, embody state dominance of the voting process regardless of
whether the offices to be filled are national, state or local. A rationale which has often been invoked to reinforce arguments for
state control of voter registration requirements is the notion that
a voter should have roots in the community of sufficient permanence
to insure adequate familiarity with local candidates and issues.
This concept of the "enlightened" voter has relevance for state
and local elections, but has been subjected to increasing criticism
because it is not germane to presidential elections.7
Specifically, the requirements for a minimum term of residence within a state, varying from six months in twelve states to
a high of two years in four states, present the greatest difficulty to
the mobile who wish to vote in elections for national legislators or
presidential and vice-presidential electors. In a few instances,
fairly lengthy county, district or precinct requirements also bar
voting. 8 The complex of these residency requirements for voting
5 Yates, Residence Requirement for Voting: Ten Years of Change, pp. 1-2, a paper
delivered at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Sept. 5-8, 1962, at Washington, D.C.
6 HAruus, MonEL VoTER REGISTRATION SYsrEM 7-27 (National Municipal League 1957).
7 Ogul, Residence Requirements as Barriers to Voting in Presidential Elections, 3
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 254-56 (1959).
a For complete information, see Chart III.
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constitutes, quantitatively, the single greatest impediment to voting by those desiring to do so. The American Heritage Foundation has systematically analyzed the causes of non-voting in several
recent presidential and congressional elections. For 1960, the
Foundation indicated that approximately 104,000,000 adult citizens were of voting age at the time of the November elections.
Of these, it estimated that 8,000,000 were mobile adults unable
to meet state, county or precinct residency requirements set by
state statutes.9
The American Heritage Foundation emphasizes the impact of
residency laws upon what it calls "our better educated and more
responsible citizens-people with the initiative and character
needed to pull up stakes and seek advancement in a new community. Many are educators, lawyers, clergymen; others are busiCHART III
Residence Required by States for Country, State,
County and District (or Precinct) in 1962•
Required
Duration of
Residence

Place where voter must reside for period indicated
In
In
In
District
In
State(2)
U.S.(1)
County
(or Precinct)

Years:
2

4

l

34

Months:
12

3
12

6
4
3

3

2

8

6
1
5
1

2
3

I
Days:

90

7

I

60
54

6

2

5
1
1

5

16

40
30

1
5

15
IO

No Requirement:

53
53

53

17

8

53

53

• Informational source: THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 19621963, 20 (1962); Chart form source (with minor revisions): Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT L
MUNICIPAL REV. 6, 7 (1956).
1 Pour states require that the voter shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least ninety days.
• Included in these Jigures are the requirements for voting in Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
0

o Byrne, Let's Modernize Our Horse-and-Buggy Election Laws!, in THE
AIIIEIUCA. 4 (1961).
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ness executives."10 Disenfranchisement by state residency requirements may, however, have a greater effect upon non-professionals,
particularly those who through occupational necessity are condemned to ceaseless geographical movement. Perhaps the plight of
the migratory farm worker in America best exemplifies this type
of disenfranchisement.
"Migratory farm laborers move restlessly over the face of
the land, but they neither belong to the land nor does the
land belong to them. They pass through community after
community, but they neither claim the community as a home
nor does the community claim them." 11
Technological changes have brought forced mobility to skilled
as well as unskilled workers. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz
has stated that, in 1962, 35,000 persons were being "pushed out
of their jobs" by the development of automated industrial processes.12 Similarly, the movement of economically distressed farmers
to urban centers and of ethnically disadvantaged Negroes from the
South provides additional evidence that disenfranchisement by
state residency requirements is not the unique burden of the middle-class professional.
Viewed from the perspective of the state legislatures, residency
requirements for voting are part of a complex of residency provisions governing a wide variety of matters. Not only is voting
contingent upon particular state residency requirements, but so
also are public office holding, the use of some state courts, the
practice of many professions, the securing of public financial assistance, and public medical, psychiatric, child welfare and adoption services.13 State legislatures derive their authority to impose
residency requirements for voting not only from the provisions
of their respective state constitutions but also from the federal
constitution. But the problems basic to the task of rendering state
residency requirements for voting more equitable to the mobile
are political as well as constitutional. Consequently, the occasional
suggestion that Congress assume responsibility to correct the situa10 Id. at 5. But Census Bureau information indicates that the largest group of migrants comprise "operatives and kindred workers," the second largest consists of craftsmen and foremen, and the third professional and technical personnel. U.S. BuREAu OF
THE CENSUS, MOBILITY OF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 1958 TO 1959, No. 104:,
at 23 (1960).
ll REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR
IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 3 (1951).

12 Des Moines Register, Oct. 21, 1962,
13 Note, 12 WYO. L.J. 50-51 (1957).

p. 3B.
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tion 14 has been treated as being both political and constitutionally impractical. Indeed, the immediate efforts to permit voting by
movers were made with seemingly full acceptance of the notion of
state primacy in the field. Whether this approach actually meets
the test of practicality and whether it constitutes the only constitutionally acceptable course are the questions to be answered.
There is little doubt that the major efforts to alleviate the
disenfranchisement of the mobile in the 1950's and early 1960's
have been predicated upon the assumption that state action was
the only feasible solution. In 1953, the Connecticut legislature
passed a law permitting former Connecticut residents to vote for
presidential and vice-presidential electors for fifteen months after
they had moved from the state or until they had fulfilled the
residency requirements of the state to which they had moved, if
this occurred within fifteen months. In the same year, Wisconsin
adopted a different approach by passing legislation permitting
new residents-who would have been eligible to vote in the state
from whence they came had they remained there until election
day-to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors.15 By
1959, several additional states had adopted laws embodying either
the Connecticut or Wisconsin approach. These inceptions of state
legislative activity underscored one of the characteristic practical
shortcomings of dependence upon state action-lack of uniformity.
In its initial consideration of the voting problems of the
mobile in 1952, the Council of State Governments did not deal
with positive legislation but chose to attack possible national
intervention in the matter. Consequently, by the time the Council
made a formal recommendation in 1956, the contradictory approaches made by Connecticut and Wisconsin were being appraised by their sister states. The Council adopted a resolution
supporting the Connecticut plan. In 1955 the national Congress
adopted a concurrent resolution suggesting that the states meet
the problem, but the resolution did not specify which of the two
solutions it deemed best.16 Finally, in August 1962 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a
proposed uniform act embodying the essentials of the Connecticut
plan. Section one of this uniform act provides:
"Each citizen of the United States who, immediately prior
14
15
16

See, e.g., Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L
See Ogul, supra note 7, at 258-59.
·
Id. at 257-62.

MUNICIPAL

REv. 6, 46 (1956).
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to his removal to this state, was a citizen of another state
and who has been a resident of this state for less than [insert
period of required residence for voting] prior to a presidential election is entitled to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors at that election, but not for other offices, if
(1) he otherwise possesses the substantive qualifications
to vote in this state, except the requirement of residence [and registration], and
(2) he complies with the provisions of this act." 17
Even before the drafting of the proposed uniform act by the
Commissioners, several states had modified their residency requirements for voting in accordance with the Connecticut or Wisconsin
model. Prior to 1950, a number of states had adopted "returnto-vote" clauses designed to modify residency requirements to
permit intrastate movers to cast ballots in their former precincts.
The comprehensive study by Yates18 indicated, however, that no
state had used the "return-to-vote" clause to alleviate the problem
for interstate movers. After 1950, several significant statutory approaches were utilized to meet the growing problem of interstate
movers and to render voting easier for intrastate movers as well,
and the period between 1950 and 1962 was one of intensified
although non-uniform activity. Six states have reduced their state,
county or precinct time of residence requirements for voting.10
Twelve states have added or extended "return-to-vote" clauses
affecting intrastate movers.20 Eight have adopted a suspension of
their state residency requirement for voting for presidential and
vice-presidential electors (the Wisconsin approach).21 Two states
adopted a "return-to-vote" clause (actually by absentee ballot)
applicable to movers who had left their states.22 One state has
adopted both the Wisconsin and Connecticut approaches.23 With
respect to the espousal of the Connecticµt approach by the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws,
the immediate prospects for uniformity appear to be dim. In fact,
17 Uniform Act for Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections,
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 1 (1962).

in 71

ANNUAL

See Yates, supra note 5, at 4-7, 14-15.
Alabama, Louisiana, ,New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
20 California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
21 California, Idaho, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and
Wisconsin.
22 Connecticut and Vermont.
23 Arizona.
18

10
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three of the adoptions of the Wisconsin approach were made in
November 1962, only three months after the Commissioners had
indicated support of the alternative plan.24
Against this backdrop of non-uniformity and strong emphasis
upon states' rights conceptions of the status of residency requirements for voting, persistent advocacy has developed for a larger
role for the national Congress in these matters. As early as 1952,
the National Institute of Municipal Clerks advocated action by
Congress to alleviate the voting problems of "interstate movers." 25
By the late 1950's and early 1960's, increasing emphasis was placed
upon the need for national rather than state action with respect
to voting residency requirements affecting congressional and presidential elections. Professor Goldman, writing in the National
Municipal Review, argued:
"Congress, for example, could direct that no citizen shall
be denied the right to vote in a congressional election for failure to meet a residence requirement. To prevent fraud or
indiscriminate voting behavior, Congress could make special
provision for adequate identification of recently arrived voters in a community."26
In particular, the clash of constitutional views which emerged in
debates over proposed civil rights legislation in Congress stimulated extended debate in the law journals. From these exchanges
a body of doctrines justifying extension of national influence has
developed. 27
What are the salient constitutional issues? Senator Ervin of
North Carolina recently summarized the traditional states' rights
arguments. 28 He argued that "the states alone possess the right
to establish qualifications for voting." 29 This derives from article I, section 2, and the seventeenth amendment which specifically
provide that the electors for Representatives and Senators "in each
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Senator Ervin cited
an 1879 Supreme Court decision30 as evidence that the Court was
Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1962, p. E3, col. I.
Ogul, supra note 7, at 256.
Goldman, supra note 14, at 46.
See, e.g., Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures over Presidential
Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 495-500 (1962).
28 Erwin, Literacy Tests for Voters: A Case Study in Federalism, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 481 (1962).
20 Id. at 483.
30 Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 418 (1879).
24
25
26
27
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committed to this viewpoint soon after the Civil War. Supporters
of Senator Ervin's position occasionally invoke the historic experience of residents in federal enclaves scattered throughout the states
as verifying contentions of exclusive state control of the qualifications of presidential and congressional electors. Furthermore, the
two major proposals for alleviating the effect of rigid state residency requirements for voting which emerged in the first full-scale
congressional consideration of the problem were predicated upon
the assumption that state primacy in the matter of voting qualifications was unquestioned.
In 1961 consideration was given to the residency requirement
problem in hearings. before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee.81
Senator Kefauver of Tennessee proposed adoption of a constitutional amendment providing that:
"The residence requirement for voting for President and
Vice-President shall be residence within one of the several
states for a period not to exceed one year. A qualified voter
changing residence from one State to another shall be entitled to vote for President and Vice-President by absentee
ballot in the state from which he moves for a period of two
years after the change of residence, provided he is not qualified to vote in another state within that period." 32
Senator Keating of New York proposed an amendment which
would lower the state residency requirements for presidential and
vice-presidential electors to ninety days. 33 The fact that both
Senators Kefauver and Keating felt that a constitutional amendment was necessary purportedly substantiated (or judiciously
sought to avoid) the claims of advocates of state primacy regarding
voting qualifications. In terms of the prospects of voluntary and
uniform state action to meet the problem, Senators Keating and
Kefauver were strong in their expressions of disbelief in the practicality of relying upon state action.34
What, if anything, can be said for direct congressional action
through ordinary legislation? Pragmatically, the prospects for
adoption of a constitutional amendment patterned after those
proposed by Senators Kefauver and Keating are exceedingly slim.
31 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments Concerning
the Nomination and Election of the President and the Vice-President and on Qualifications for Voting of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961),
32 S.J. Res. 14, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See Hearings, supra note 31, pt. I, at 13.
33 S.J. Res. 90, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See Hearings, supra note 31, pt. I, at 23.
34 Hearings, supra note 31, pt. I, at 34, 275-77.
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Similarly, the possibilities for voluntary uniform state action are
slight. Not only is the non-uniform and rather sporadic experience
of the past decade discouraging, but also, because residency requirements for voting are often written into the state's fundamental law, meaningful change can be accomplished in many
states only through amendment of the state constitution. Advocates of state activity argue on the authority of article II, section I,
clause 2,35 and McPherson v. Blacker,36 that state constitutional
requirements for a minimum term of residence have no limiting
authority in situations where a state legislature prescribes lesser
requirements for those voting for presidential and vice-presidential
electors.37 Yet the strong resistance to this interpretation that
developed at recent governors' conferences portends extended
political debate and prolonged litigation should an attempt to implement this approach be made. In short, the practical and constitutional difficulties inherent in state activity suggest that a thorough appraisal of the alternative of direct congressional action via
ordinary legislation might be appropriate.
Direct congressional action would meet the need for uniformity and could also incorporate provisions which would embody
full recognition of the fact that modern America is a highly mobile
society. Professor Goldman has specifically recommended that
"Congress develop some system of reward for those States adopting reciprocal arrangements to allow recently moved voters to
exercise the franchise in presidential elections without undue
delay upon arrival to the new residence." 38 Because concern about
possible fraud has been a prime topic in every serious discussion
about the possibility of minimizing residency requirements, Goldman has also suggested that modern identification techniques be
adapted to the registration and voting process. In order to provide
an effective and nationwide system, Congress should, he concluded,
create a National Board of Elections.39 These suggestions, if properly implemented, would render state residency requirements
more flexible and yet sufficient to inhibit fraud.
What constitutional justification can be found for such congressional intervention? Perhaps the boldest and most direct in35 "Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
a Number of Electors ••••"
36 146 U.S. I (1892).
37 Lugg, Memorandum Concerning Election Laws, in 71 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 10 (1962).
38 Hearings, supra note !11, pt. 2, at !149.
39 Id. at !149-50.
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vocation of constitutional scripture can be made with respect to
section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. Vitalization of this provision would inhibit the setting of residency requirements for voting by the states by reducing a state's representation in the House
of Representatives when the right to vote "is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion or other crime."40 The historical
record of the adoption of this amendment and the literal interpretation of the penalty clause underscore the fact that this embodies the most direct of federal constitutional limitations upon
the powers of the states.41
The considerations in The Slaughter-House Cases42 which impelled Mr. Justice Miller to reject John Archibald Campbell's
argument that the relationship of individuals to the nation had
been fundamentally altered at the expense of the states no longer
obtain. Indeed, the fact that Mr. Justice Field and his fellow
dissenters in Slaughter-House have long been recognized as more
successful prophets, as to the due process and equal protection
clauses, than Mr. Justice Miller suggests that implementation of
the penalty clause of the fourteenth amendment would be consistent with contemporary developments in federal-state relations.
The prospect that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment may be invoked as a limitation on state power to set
voting qualifications has received extensive consideration as a
result of the recent congressional debates over poll tax and literacy
test provisions. It is pertinent to note that the clause was first
invoked for this purpose in Pope v. Williams, 43 a 1904 case involving a complicated state residency requirement for voting, and that
the possibility was commented upon favorably by the Court even
though the circumstances did not warrant application in that case.
In the oral argument for plaintiff in that case, the contention
was made that:
"On the transfer of residence from one State to another a
citizen of the United States is vested 'with the same rights
as other citizens of that State.' ... This necessarily includes
Cf. Everett, Foreword, 27 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 327, 328 n.4 (1962).
See Bonfield, The Right To Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108 (1960), for an excellent case for utilization of this provision.
42 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
43 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
40
41
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the right not to be arbitrarily discriminated against in the
acquisition and enjoyment of political rights, because of his
removal from another State. The statute may, therefore,
properly be held also to be repugnant to the second section
of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United
States."44
In reply, the attorney for the state of Maryland argued:
"Tests, qualifications, disqualifications, denials, abridgments, distinctions, inequalities, may still lawfully be made
at the pleasure of the States, provided only they do not discriminate against the negro.
"If they apply equally, impartially and uniformly to white
and black citizens alike, they are not condemned by the letter
or the spirit of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. They may perhaps cost the States a reduction
in their Congressional representation in the proportion in
which the number of adult males disfranchised in such state
legislation bears to the whole number of its adult male population. But this is the only legal consequence, and there is
not warrant for the contention that the Federal judiciary can
also declare such legislation absolutely void." 45
Mr. Justice Peckham, in ruling against the plaintiff, did not
see fit to utilize the equal protection clause, but left no doubt
that the clause could be invoked against state voting regulations
of a discriminatory nature. He speculated that:
"The question might arise if an exclusion from the privilege of voting were founded upon the particular State from
which the person came, excluding from that privilege, for instance, a citizen of the United States coming from Georgia
and allowing it to a citizen of the United States coming from
New York, or any other state. In such case, an argument
might be urged that, under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, the citizen from Georgia was by
the state statute deprived of the equal protection of the
laws." 46
In the modern context, the unusually long residency required
for voting in several of the Southern states may well constitute
"invidious discrimination" against poor whites and Negroes who
44
45
46

Id. at 627.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 634.
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by occupational necessity are forced to migrate seasonally. This
sort of discrimination, properly documented, could provide a judicially acceptable basis for invocation of the equal protection
clause as a limitation upon state authority to set voting qualifications. 47 But where the impact of rigid and long residency requirements does not fall in a manner suggestive of ethnic, class,
or economic discrimination, public policy alternatives predicated
upon assumptions of congressional supremacy in the field of voting
rights deserve full consideration and effective implementation.
Electoral procedures which make citizenship participation difficult affect not only the rate of participation but often influence
the partisan direction of balloting. Thus the ethnic, occupational
or political groups which have, and realize that they have, only a
very limited ability to influence elections and subsequent public
policy often are oriented toward the minority political party
within their state. When a longstanding majority party enacts
statutes which render voting more difficult, it serves not only to
enhance its own position but to weaken the sense of public obligation of some elements in the citizenry and to render more difficult the development of effective two-party competition.48 These
latter elements are traditionally considered foundations of the
democratic process.
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Classic,49 recognized
that Congress had a constitutional obligation to protect the "integrity" of elections for representatives to the House of Representatives. The salient commitment of Classic is that those elements
in such electoral processes which are "integral" fall within proper
congressional authority under article 1, section 4, and article l,
section 8, clause 18. Specifically, the majority wrote:
"While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives
in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from
the states • . . , this statement is true only in the sense that
the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on
the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I, to the extent that
Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its
powers to regulate elections under § 4 and its more general
power under Article I, § 8, clause 18 of the Constitution 'to
47 For a contemporary statement of the argument that this clause may be invoked
in voting discrimination cases, see Kirby, supra note 27, at 496.
48 For an excellent analysis of the relationship of state election laws and political
behavior, see CAMPBELL, CONVERSE, MILLER &: STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 266-89 (1960).
49 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry
into execution the foregoing powers.' " 50
Similar interpretative justification for congressional intervention can be found regarding voting for presidential and vicepresidential electors in Burroughs v. United States. 51 There the
Court held that the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 could
be applied to such electors.
Indeed, Congress has successfully invoked not only the constitutional provisions directly referring to elections, but also the war
power and its power to govern federal territory. In a 1942 act,52
for example, Congress granted members of the armed forces the
right to vote for members of Congress and presidential and vicepresidential electors without fulfillment of various state registration, residency or poll tax requirements. The validity of this act
has not been tested constitutionally. 53 Similarly, some commentators argue that Congress may, if it desires, draft legislation insuring
that residents of enclaves under exclusive federal jurisdiction may
vote for federal officers in elections regulated by authorities of the
state surrounding the enclave. 54 That the Congress has already assumed such authority is found in the statute relating to the voting
rights of persons living within the jurisdiction of Shenandoah National Park in the state of Virginia. 55 The statute provides:
"Persons residing in or on any of the said lands embraced
in said Shenandoah National Park shall have the right to
establish a voting residence in Virginia by reason thereof,
and the consequent right to vote at all elections within the
county or city in which said land or lands upon which they
reside are located upon like terms and conditions, and to the
same extent, as they would be entitled to vote in such county
or city if the said lands on which they reside had not been
deeded or conveyed to the United States of America." 56
In the final analysis, the solution of the problem of the mobile
voter lies not in speculation over alternative modes of constitutional
interpretation. Justification for uniform legislation can be derived
Id. at 315.
290 U.S. 534 (1934).
Act of Sept. 16, 1942, ch. 561, 56 Stat. 753, repealed and replaced by Federal
Voting Assistance Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 584, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2171-96 (1958).
53 Kirby, supra note 27, at 500.
M Gerwig, The Elective Franchise for Residents of Federal Areas, 24 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 404 (1956).
55 56 Stat. 322 (1942), 16 U.S.C. § 403c-l(h) (1958).
56 Ibid. See also Gerwig, supra note 54, at 421 n.69.
50
51
52
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from a variety of constitutional, statutory and judicial sources.
Clearly, impediments to such congressional action are political
rather than constitutional. Yet the tensions of our mobile society
have themselves pointed toward bolder federal activity in the field
of voting rights. To the extent that urbanites achieve greater
representation in the state legislatures and the national House of
Representatives, their self-interest renders politically feasible the
establishment of a national policy governing residency requirements for voting. The political repercussions of Baker v. Carr
and its progeny give promise of swift developments in this direction.

